In interview with Haaretz, Itamar Rabinovich, who was at the heart of Israel's peace negotiations with Syria in the 1990s, criticizes Israel's creeping annexation in the West Bank, bemoans weak Palestinian leadership.
By Amos Harel | Jun.22, 2012
For decades Prof. Itamar Rabinovich has studied the Middle
East, analyzing Israel's complex status in the region and documenting
its attempts to achieve peace with its neighbors. For four years
(1993-1996 ) he himself took an active part in the diplomatic efforts as
Israel's ambassador to the United States and head of the Israeli
delegation to negotiations with Syria, as Yitzhak Rabin's envoy. (After
Rabin's assassination, Rabinovich continued as ambassador under Shimon
Peres but not as head of the delegation. )
In the epilogue to his new book, "The Lingering Conflict: Israel, the
Arabs and the Middle East 1948-2011" (newly published in Hebrew;
published in English by Brookings Institution Press in November 2011 ),
Rabinovich writes that in the past year, "Israel's relationship with the
Arab world and its strategic position in the Middle East reached a
particularly low point."
Rabinovich believes that much of what has occurred in the region
recently, and particularly what was initially called the Arab Spring,
was not dependent on anything Israel did. From its perspective, the
gloomy regional situation began 10 years ago , and Israel in response
relied on anchors from the old order, notably the peace treaties and
security coordination with the authorities in Egypt and Jordan. Those
old props have now been called into serious question. Concurrently,
other worrisome developments are unfolding in the region, especially
Iran's effort to produce nuclear weapons, the growing hegemony of Turkey
- a former strategic partner but now a bitter rival - and the waning
influence of the United States.
"The transition to asymmetrical military confrontation, the threat
posed by missiles and rockets to the Israeli rear and the collapse of
the peace process have come together to create a more difficult
situation than Israel faced a decade ago," Rabinovich tells Haaretz.
"These are causes for pessimism. On the Palestinian track, I am afraid
that the chairman of the Palestinian Authority, Abu Mazen [Mahmoud
Abbas], is not ready to sign off on the end of the conflict. That is a
function of his personal ideology, his character and his historical
location. In the end, he is a 1948 refugee. On the other side, a rigid
right-wing government is in power in Israel. One of its key members,
Education Minister Gideon Sa'ar, speaking at a ceremony in which he
presented the "Moskowitz Prize for Zionism," called for the renunciation
of the two-state vision.
"We have a weak Palestinian side with question marks about its desire
and ability to reach a final-status agreement," Rabinovich says. "In the
background there is Hamas, which is capable of sabotaging a settlement,
if it were achieved. At the moment it is impossible to reach a full
settlement with the Palestinians. Two bold moves, by Ehud Barak [in
2000] and Ehud Olmert [in 2008], did not generate a Palestinian quid pro
quo. For the time being, in the absence of a partner for a final
settlement, with the right-wing government that is in power here and in
light of the regional uncertainty, even though I am critical of Prime
Minister Netanyahu, I would not advise him to enter into far-reaching
territorial compromises. I would wait with that. I can definitely
understand the desire to see what is happening around us first."
At the same time, Rabinovich opposes "the creeping Israeli annexation
in the West Bank" and regrets "the lack of an effort to reach partial
settlements in the Palestinian arena." Israel, he says, should engage in
regional diplomacy and not remain a passive bystander. "But we also
have to bear in mind that at least until the elections in November, the
United States is not a player. And if the Republicans win, it will take
them time to get organized afterward. For all these reasons, I do not
see any major relevant move being made in the near future."
'Assad will fall'
Rabinovich gained most of his academic prestige, in Israel and abroad,
from his research on Syria and Lebanon. Concerning the current situation
of Syrian President Bashar Assad, he says, "His fate is sealed. Bashar
will fall. I have said that since the first escalation in the fighting
with the opposition, at the beginning of last summer. In the meantime,
Assad is unable to neutralize the resistance, whereas the weak and
divided opposition is not succeeding in toppling him. A prolonged and
even more murderous civil war is liable to break out in Syria, together
with a large-scale refugee crisis and the spillover of the violence into
Lebanon and Iraq. The Syrian government has lost control of large
sections of the country. Even after the massacre that Assad's father
perpetrated against the Muslim Brotherhood in Hama, 30 years ago, he
retained legitimacy. But the younger Assad has lost legitimacy
completely."
Since leaving diplomacy, including the period in which he served as
president of Tel Aviv University (1999-2007 ), Rabinovich has
extensively analyzed the political processes between Israel and its
neighbors. In his 1999 book "The Brink of Peace," he documented the
failed peace negotiations with Damascus during the period of Rabin and
Peres. Another 1999 book, "Waging Peace: Israel and the Arabs at the End
of the Century," offered a concise account of the political and
diplomatic contacts. "The Lingering Conflict," an expanded and updated
revision of "Waging Peace," explains, in the author's characteristically
clear and articulate style, everything that went wrong in the long
years of negotiations in the various arenas, though not overlooking the
lone successes: the peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan.
Rabinovich also locates the major regional missed opportunity around
that same time, namely the failure of the negotiations with Syria during
the Rabin period. "The critical turning point was the gambit that Rabin
presented to Secretary of State Warren Christopher on August 3, 1993,"
he says. This took the form of a hypothetical question: outlining the
Israeli terms for a future peace settlement, implicit in which was
readiness for a full withdrawal from the Golan Heights, based on the
expectation of a detailed Syrian reply.
"An opportunity was missed there," Rabinovich says. "The gambit could
have been transformed into the basis for an Israeli-Syrian peace treaty,
in which case the peace process would have been predicated on a Syrian
cornerstone, before progress was made with the Palestinians. Yasser
Arafat's centrality would have changed, and with it everything that
followed."
And if we had given the Golan Heights back to the Syrians, what would
we look like today, in light of the massacres being perpetrated by them?
"If Syria had signed a peace treaty with us, it would not be in the
situation in which it now finds itself. One of the reasons Hafez Assad
reached the finish line [of an agreement] but did not cross it was his
fear that the regime would lose its raison d'etre. How do you justify
such a vast military and intelligence machine when the Israeli enemy has
ceased to be an enemy? By then, Assad had embarked on the [Anwar] Sadat
road, which he had rejected contemptuously in 1977. Sadat came to terms
with Israel and drew closer to the United States. The Syrians wanted
the same. If Syria had signed an agreement with us, it would not have
become a parliamentary democracy, but deep, positive transformations
would have taken place in both Syria and Lebanon.
"Rabin asked me to try to find out if it would be possible to reach a
peace agreement with the Syrians. He did not tell me explicitly that he
would withdraw fully from the Golan Heights, but it was clear he was
ready to go very far. In the [1992] election campaign, which he won, he
said explicitly that he would not withdraw from the Golan Heights.
Afterward, he started to have second thoughts. Rabin did not believe in comprehensive agreements but in a step-by-step approach. He examined
both tracks - the Syrian and the Palestinian - concurrently. With the
Syrians it was impossible to achieve a true dialogue, not even via the
Americans. [Hafez] Assad insisted on an Israeli commitment to withdraw
fully from the Golan. Before that, Assad refused to detail exactly how
he saw the final agreement.
"In the meantime," Rabinovich continues, "the negotiations with the
Palestinians moved on to the Oslo track. In July 1993, Rabin faced a
dilemma. On the one hand, the Oslo Accords were ready for signing; on
the other, we had made a modicum of progress with the Syrians. The
atmosphere had improved, though there was no breakthrough.
"Rabin was very ambivalent about Oslo. He felt an obligation to clarify
whether he had a Syrian option, and then he conceived the idea of the
gambit [known in Hebrew as the "pikadon" - the deposit]. With it he
tried to advance the negotiations.
"Warren Christopher arrived in Israel at the beginning of August.
Dennis Ross and I were also both present in the meeting in Rabin's
bureau. It was then that Rabin dropped his bombshell and gave
Christopher the 'deposit.' 'It is in your pocket,' he said. 'Do not put
it on the table [in talks with the Syrians]. If the story leaks, I will
withdraw the deposit.'
"I have no proof for this, but my impression is that the Americans did
in fact present the gambit to Assad, who immediately said, 'Yes, but...'
And then he started the bargaining from the point Rabin had reached.
That immediately narrowed the scope of the discussions, because the
principle of full withdrawal was already a given.
"Assad was unwilling to invest even an ounce of effort in public
diplomacy. In the direct talks, in an informal encounter by the coffee
machine, Muwaffaq Allaf, the head of the Syrian delegation, said to me,
'I hope your government understands that Assad cannot receive from you
less than Sadat received before him.' I replied that we hoped Assad
understood that he had to give in exchange what Sadat offered. One of
the things Sadat gave to Menachem Begin was the work he did vis-a-vis
the Israeli public - his willingness to speak in the Knesset.
"Assad believed in negotiating only from strength, in applying pressure
up to the last minute. He did not want to grasp the fact that by arming
Hezbollah and sending it into action against us in southern Lebanon, he
was making the Israeli public continue to view him as an enemy. That is
why the campaign of 'The nation stands with the Golan' focused on the
negative image of the elder Assad - and it succeeded.
"And then, in August 1993, the Americans went on their summer vacation.
There was no real follow-up to Rabin's gambit. By the time they got
back, the negotiations on the Oslo Accords had become public and the
agreement with the Palestinians was concluded. If you had arrived at a
moment when Rabin, of all people, was ready to withdraw from the Golan,
the right thing to do was to remain in the region and try to finish it
off. It was a mistake by Bill Clinton's people to go home. All the
parties made mistakes all along the way."
Rabinovich adds that if "Rabin was ambivalent about agreements, Hafez
Assad certainly was. In 1995, after the second meeting between the
respective army chiefs of staff - Amnon Lipkin-Shahak and Hikmat Shihabi
- Rabin told me it wouldn't work out with Assad in this way. Only when
geopolitical pressure could be exerted on him, from Iraq or via Lebanon,
would it be possible to move forward, but this would not be during the
present term of office.
"Henry Kissinger spent a month in the region in 1974 to work out the
separation-of-forces agreements [with Egypt]. If Christopher had done
the same, history might have changed - or, of course, it might not have.
"In 1994, when President Clinton visited Damascus, after the signing of
the Israel-Jordan peace treaty in the Arava desert, Assad drove with
him in the car to the airport and told him: 'If we sign, I want to get
what the Egyptians are getting' - meaning economic and security aid. But
Clinton was drowsy and didn't take in what he had heard. The Americans
actually wanted to advance the Syrian agreement under their mediation.
Dennis Ross and Martin Indyk preferred the Syrian track: Already then,
they wanted to distance Syria from Iran, and they thought this would
have a positive regional effect. The assumption was that Assad was ripe
for signing and also to deliver the goods afterward.
"When Rabin decided to present the gambit, he wanted an agreement with
Syria and a gradual process with the Palestinians. After the opportunity
was missed, the Syrian pillar did not come through and the process was
built on the Palestinian pillar. If the process had been conducted with
both pillars, the foundation would have been more solid and Arafat would
have lost bargaining chips."
Another failed attempt to reach an agreement with the Syrians was made
by Ehud Barak in 2000. "I did not take part in the Shepherdstown talks,"
Rabinovich says. "There, too, the three parties made mistakes. If the
Syrians thought that Foreign Minister Farouq al-Sharaa could refuse to
shake Barak's hand even in private, they were wrong. What kind of
message was that? What did the Israeli public glean from that behavior?
"It's hard for me to impute responsibility in percentages," Rabinovich
says. "The Americans claim we missed an opportunity, but in March 2000,
in Geneva, the meeting between Clinton and Assad broke down within seven
minutes, when Assad said no. The failure cannot be divorced from his
physical and mental state [Assad died three months later]. He had
already begun to forget names, and beforehand he had an absolute
memory."
I put it to Rabinovich that although he regrets missing the chance for
peace with the Syrians, many Israelis, viewing the images of the
massacres there, say it's fortunate that we were not lured into signing
an agreement with them. Indeed, some people are wondering whether there
might be excessive brutality embedded in the Syrian national character,
if it can be described in those terms. After all, Hosni Mubarak did not
allow his security forces to mow down opponents in this way. For years
there were also stories in Israel about how the treatment of the Israeli
POWs in the Yom Kippur War was crueler in Syria than in Egypt.
"I don't think there was a difference in the treatment of POWs,"
Rabinovich replies. "But there is no doubt that the Syrian and Egyptian
cultures are radically different. I also saw that in the interaction
with them regarding the peace process. When you walk down an Egyptian
street, people smile at you. In the Levant they scowl. In Syria, as in
Iraq, the culture is more brutal. On the other hand, you can look at it
from the opposite perspective and admire the courage of the Syrian
citizens who are demonstrating against the regime in the knowledge that
it is liable to cost them their life or land them in prison and torture.
The fear barrier there has been shattered."
You spoke about the missed opportunity of the gambit, but wasn't
Rabin's assassination the major reason for the fading of the talks?
"There is something to that. When [Rabin's assassin] Yigal Amir was
allowed to vote in the elections, [New York Times columnist] Tom
Friedman called him 'The man who voted twice.' I don't have an answer to
the question of whether we would have achieved final-status agreements
in the 1990s if Rabin had not been assassinated. I think there was a
good prospect of that, because of the force of Rabin's personality, his
status as a security authority and his ability to have his way with the
public. The Rabin-Peres connection was complex, but helped in this
regard."
Rabin wasn't the only one. Ariel Sharon also knew how to get things done.
"Sharon had the same ability, without question. I found it very
interesting to write the chapter about Sharon in the book. I was a sharp
critic of his approach in Lebanon in 1982. But I saw the transformation
he underwent in his years as prime minister. It was Sharon who won the
confrontation with the Palestinians in the second intifada and extracted
Israel from what looked like its deepest crisis since its
establishment. He achieved a status comparable to that of Ben-Gurion.
Ben-Gurion established the state, Sharon gave it back to us. Sharon
stopped the intifada and acquired an unprecedented public status. He
matured when he reached the position of ultimate responsibility. I do
not accept the argument that the disengagement from Gaza was his attempt
to get media support in the face of the criminal investigations against
him. It went deeper than that."
In the epilogue to the book you describe the Netanyahu government as
possessing a nationalist, right-wing, aggressive ideology that abets the
thwarting of peace efforts. But this government was not elected by
chance: The Israeli public is leaning increasingly to the right. In the
eyes of the average voter, the Israeli withdrawals, the Oslo Accords,
the withdrawal from Lebanon and the disengagement from Gaza brought more
harm than benefit.
"In 2006, Ehud Olmert presented the 'convergence plan,' which derived
from the Second Lebanon War. Subsequently, there was only a hair's
breadth between Tzipi Livni and the formation of a government. There is a
difference between a hypothetical and a concrete situation. If a vote
were taken today on a settlement similar to the one that Olmert offered
Abu Mazen four years ago, 70 percent of the public would probably oppose
it. But if you proposed it with the whole supportive envelope of
final-status agreements and their inherent advantages, the balance of
forces could be reversed. We need to place great emphasis on the
strength of leadership, the kind that Rabin and Sharon possessed, and
its ability to achieve agreements."
